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Rudolf p. Botha 
University of Stellenbosch 
1 The questions 
Are we human beings different from all other kinds of creatures? Do we differ from other 
kinds of creatures in ways that matter to us? If we do, what is it that makes us significantly 
different? And what kind of creatures are we anyway? 
For centuries, people have mused, thought and agonized about questions such as these; from 
gifted scholars to ordinary people. Even politicians have raised these questions — doubtless 
because the answers they had up their sleeve were politically expedient. For example, 
intervening in a debate in Oxford in 1864 on the topic of human evolution, Benjamin Disraeli 
scornfully asked: 
'What is the question now placed before society with a glib assurance the most 
astounding?' 
And, he proceeded: 
'The question is this: Is man an ape or an angel?' 
Responding to his own question, Disraeli proclaimed to the chair with great conviction: 
'I, my Lord, I am on the side of the angels.'' 
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In siding with the angels, Disraeli spoke for a view which, according to the American 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995a:338), most people ache to believe: that we human beings 
are vastly different from other animal species. And, Dennett assures us, most people are right: 
humans are different. And the reason why humans are different, in his view, is that humans are 
the only species that has language. 
Which brings us to a second cluster of questions: What exactly is involved in having language? 
In what ways has language made us humans different? What kind of creatures are we in virtue 
of having language? Are the categories of 'ape' and 'angel' the best ones for getting a fix on 
our human creaturehood? Or are there perhaps better categories for pinning down what our 
humanity involves? 
Questions of this second cluster are what I would like to deal with in what follows. My general 
aim is to let you see that there is a conceptual framework within which we can get a 
perspective on our humanity that is more illuminating than the conventional perspective in 
which some distinction between apes and angels is drawn. And, assuming this unconventional 
framework, I would like to give you some idea of how man's humanity may have been shaped 
by man's language. 
2 Language 
So what does it mean to say that people have language? On an influential position — one 
developed by Noam Chomsky — it means that people have a certain mental faculty: the 
language faculty. A person's language faculty has two important sides or states, as these are 
known technically. On the one hand, there is the attained state: this state embodies a person's 
tacit knowledge of one or more specific languages — for example, English, Venda, Afrikaans, 
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Eskimo and so on. Without knowledge of a language, one cannot produce or understand 
utterances in the language. On the other hand, there is the initial state of the language faculty: 
this embodies a person's capacity to learn or acquire knowledge of one or more specific 
languages. What the initial state of the language faculty does, in other words, is to make 
possible the acquisition of the tacit knowledge embodied in the attained state of the language 
faculty. Of course, for the initial state of the language faculty to be able to play this role, 
people have to be exposed to utterances of specific languages. To have language, in a nutshell, 
involves (a) having tacit knowledge of one or more specific languages and, (b) more basically, 
having the capacity to acquire knowledge of one or more specific languages.^ 
But what is it that one knows when one knows a language? A language known by someone can 
be thought of as a means — or code — that makes it possible for him/her as a speaker to 
convert or translate messages or meanings into utterances. And possible form him/her as a 
listener or hearer to convert utterances into intended messages or meanings.^ 
3 Walking angels 
Let us then consider the possibility that, in virtue of having language, we are angels or — to 
put it a bit more modestly — angel-like creatures. To assert this possibility is, in essence, to 
claim two things. First, there is the claim that we are angel-like in the sense that we are linked 
in some way to some supernatural being, force or the like. Second, there is the claim that 
language provides the link — or part of the link — between us and that supernatural entity in 
the sense that we received language from it as a gift. These two claims are put forward in 
various forms in religious and philosophical texts and even in scientific writings, it has been 
recently argued. 
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As for religious texts: in the sacred texts of a variety of religions, it is stated that man was 
given language by his/her G/god or C/creator. As you n\ay recall, for instance, according to 
Judaeo-Christian beliefs, God gave Adam language in the form of the capacity to name every 
living creature.'^ 
For another instance, according to the religion of Ancient Egypt, the creator of speech was the 
god Thot. In terms of Hindu religious beliefs, to mention one more example, man was given 
language by the goddess Sarasvati. If these religious beliefs are true, we humans have what 
could be called an 'angel-like side' indeed: language is man's divine connection. But, to us as 
linguists, the claim that language is a divine gift is simply unacceptable as a scientific claim. 
On the one hand, this claim lacks the kind of testable consequences that distinguishes scientific 
claims from metaphysical speculations. On the other hand, this claim is not supported by 
factual evidence of the kind required for the justification of linguistic hypotheses. 
This brings us to the philosophical writings portraying language as something given to man by 
God or a god. Two examples should suffice. The first is provided by the British empiricist 
philosopher, John Locke, who in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690 stated 
the orthodox view that 
'God, having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an 
inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but 
furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie 
of society.' (quoted by Salmon 1994:2884) 
A more detailed philosophical account of the divine origin of language was furnished in 1766 
by the German Johann Peter Sussmilch who argued as follows: 
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'Language is either of divine or human origin. If it is of human origin, it is either 
innate or acquired. If iMguage were innate, there could be species-specific natural 
cries, which is not the case; if, however, it were acquired, it would either consist of 
random sounds, which would be unsystematic; or else it would be systematic and 
therefore reasonable. The latter is the case, therefore language is the product of reason. 
But reason cannot be conveyed without signs (i.e. speech or writing): therefore 
language cannot be of human origin: therefore it must be God-given.' (quoted by 
Salmon 1994:2885) 
This argument of Siissmilch's might have impressed 18th-centuiy philosophers. From a 
contemporary linguistic perspective, however, it is without any merit: the claims it 
incorporates lack the required factual and/or systematic support. And the same goes for 
philosophical speculations on the origin of language in general. Which means that, like 
religious ones, philosophical accounts fail to provide the right kind of justification — 
justification of a factual sort — for attributing to humans the status of flightless angels. 
The idea that language originated in a supernatural or miraculous way is implicit in the writings 
of famous present-day scientists too. This has recendy been claimed by Daniel Dennett 
(1995a), who criticizes various scholars for covertly assigning language the status of what he 
calls a 'skyhook'.^ So what is a skyhook? And what, if anything, is bad about skyhooks? 
As observed by Dennett (1995a:74), the first use of the word skyhook noted by the Oxford 
English Dictionary is from 1915, when an aeroplane pilot commanded to stay in the air for 
another hour replied 'the machine is not fitted with skyhooks'. The meaning of skyhook is 
defined by the OED as follows: 'An imaginary contrivance for attachment to the sky; an 
imaginary means of suspension in the sky'. 
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Extending its meaning metaphorically, Dennett (1995a:76) uses skyhook to denote imaginary, 
nonphysical, nonmechanical processes that are invoked by scholars to account for the evolution 
of certain entities. And he contrasts skyhooks with what he calls "cranes'. As Dennett 
(1995a:75) characterizes them, cranes are real processes which work in the evolution of entities 
in a mechanical, gradual step-by-step way. Darwinian natural selection, on Dennett's view, is 
the fundamental crane involved in the evolution of all living things, including human beings. 
And, Dennett believes, human language too has originated and evolved gradually in a blind, 
mechanical way through natural selection.® 
What is more, scholars unwilling to embrace without reservation a selectionist account of the 
evolution of human language are accused by Dennett of assigning it the status of a 'skyhook'. 
In this connection, Dennett (1995a:388) singles out, as the leading sinners, Noam Chomsky 
and Stephen Jay Gould. Chomsky he calls 'the world's greatest linguist'; Gould he accords the 
status of 'the world's best known evolutionary theorist'. In regard to Chomsky, for example, 
Dennett (1995b: 122) has asserted recently that: 
'Noam Chomsky, when he resists evolutionary accounts of the creation of the language 
organ, would probably like it to be a skyhook, a sort of Gift from God that sets us apart 
from the rest of mechanical creation and is inexplicable in terms of brute mechanism.' 
Remarks such as the following by Chomsky (1988:170) are interpreted by Dennett (1995a:389) 
as symptomatic of a skyhook stance on the origin of language: 
'It may be that at some remote period a mutation took place that gave rise to the 
property of discrete infmity, perhaps for reasons that have to do with the biology of 
cells, to be explained in terms of properties of physical mechanisms, now unknown.... 
Quite possibly other aspects of its evolutionary development again reflect the operation 
of physical laws applying to a brain of a certain degree of complexity.' 
http://spilplus.journals.ac.za
7 
To Dennett, these remarks indicate that Chomsky does not consider the language organ or 
faculty to be an adaptation, making its origin a mystery to Dennett. 
If Dennett's reading of Chomsky were correct, then on Chomsky's view we humans would be 
a rather special kind of divinely connected creatures. But such a view would lack any 
plausibility. The plausibility considerations that seem to bear on the evolution of language 
indicate that the language faculty evolved as a biological adaptation — in other words in a 
Darwinian and nonmiraculous way. Which means that, from a scientific perspective, our 
having language is highly unlikely to make us into angels, not even angels of the walking 
variety.^ 
4 Talking apes 
So, then, if our language does not make us angel-like creatures, perhaps we are a (sub)species 
of apes — talking apes, to be more specific? This is a question which I have to pursue in a 
somewhat indirect way; so please bear with me. 
It is now fairly generally believed that ordinary big apes such as chimpanzees lack the language 
faculty that we humans have. On the one hand, there is evidence that big apes lack the capacity 
for acquiring human language in a spontaneous way. Reared in a deaf family, a young ape like 
Nim Chimpsky, for instance, typically fails to pick up American Sign Language in the 
spontaneous way that human children do.® 
On the other hand, there is evidence that big apes lack the computational linguistic capacity for 
constructing an unbounded range of expressions in an innovative way. Put more bluntly, big 
apes don't have syntax. Thus, highly trained chimps cannot do better than repetitively produce 
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a restricted number of jumbled strings of 'words' or 'signs' such as Me eat me eat, You me 
banana me banana you, Give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me eat orange 
give me you.^ 
But, you may wonder, does it really matter that big apes don't have human language? What of 
any significance does this say about the differences between humans and big apes? In virtue of 
having a language faculty, how are we better off than big apes? What benefits do we derive 
from having human language that big apes don't derive from having 'ape languages': the 
repertoires of gestures, postures, calls, barks, screams, squeals, chutters, purrs, chirps, 
coughs, roars, screeches, and growls by means of which they communicate?^*^ To arrive at an 
interesting answer to these questions, we have to abandon the rather primitive 'angel vs. ape' 
dichotomy. What we need is a more principled conceptual framework for distinguishing in an 
illuminating way among various Mnds of creatures, a framework such as that recently proposed 
by Dennett (1995a:373-385).^l 
5 Cognizing creatures 
On the basis of how they react to their environment in the process of evolution, Dennett 
(1995a:373ff.) distinguishes between four kinds of creatures. The behavioural differences 
among these four kinds of creatures reflect, as Dennett (1995a:373) puts it, various 'design 
options for brains'. Some options confer more brain power on the creatures involved; other 
options confer less brain power on them. 
The first kind of creatures — Darwinian creatures Dennett (1995a: 374) calls them — 
represents organisms that were blindly generated in the process of evolution by more or less 
arbitrary processes of recombination and mutation of genes. These organisms had so-called 
hard-wired phenotypes. This means that the whole of a creature's observable characteristics 
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was fully fi*®*' birth; it could not be changed during its lifespan in response to pressures 
exerted by the environment. These creatures, in other words, were unable to react adaptively to 
their environment J ^ Only the best designs survived in so-called field-tests, as is made clear in 
Figure 1. 
Environment 
Darwinian creatures, different 
"hard-wired" phenotypes 
selection of one favored 
phenotype 
multiplication of the 
favored genotype 
Figure 1 (= Dennett's (1995a:374) Figure 13.1) 
Creatures of the second kind — Skinnerian creatures Dennett (1995a:374) calls them — have 
the property of phenotypic plasticity. They have not been wholly designed at the time of birth 
and some elements of their design can be adjusted in response to pressures exerted by the 
environment. Some have wired-in "reinforcers" that happen to favour so-called 'Smart Moves', 
actions that favour their agents. Confronted with the environment, these organisms generate or 
produce a variety of actions or moves, which they blindly try out one by one until they find a 
move that works. Being capable of blind trial-and-error learning only, these creatures exhibit 
Skinnerian conditioning and plasticity in the way illustrated in Figure 2: 
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Skinnerian creature 'blindly" 
tries different responses ... 
... until one is selected by Next time, the creature's first 
"reinforcement." choice will be the reinforced response. 
Figure 2 (= Dennett's (1995a:375) Figure 13.2) 
According to Dennett (1995a:376), Skinnerian creatures are found among the simple 
invertebrates, an example being the sea slug Aplysia. 
Skinnerian conditioning has an important limitation: an early error may kill you off. A better 
system, Dennett (1995a:374) observes, involves preselection among all the possible behaviours 
or actions. The point of such preselection is to weed out the truly stupid options before risking 
them in the harsh world. The third kind of creatures distinguised by Dennett (1995a:375), so-
called Popperian creatures, are capable of the refinement embodied in preselection. In Karl 
Popper's own words, this design enhancement 'permits our hypotheses to die in our stead'. 
Popperian creatures are smarter than Skinnerian creatures: Skinnerian creatures survive because 
they make lucky first moves; Popperian creamres, however, survive because they make better-
than-chance first moves. Popperian preselection presupposes feedback that has to come from an 
inner environment. As Dennett (1995a:375) characterizes an inner environment, it is an inner 
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something structured in such a way that the sunogate actions it favours are more often than not 
the very actions the real world would also bless if they were actually performed. To play this 
role in preselection — as schematically represented, in Figure 3 — the inner environment must 
contain lots of information about the outer world and its regularities. 
Popperian creature has an inner 
selective environment that previews 
candidate acts. 
First time, the creature acts in a 
foresightfiil way (better than chance). 
Figure 3 (= Dennett's (1995a:375) Figure 13.3) 
According to Dennett (1995a:376), all fish, reptiles, birds and mammals are Popperian 
creatures. 
Which brings us to the fourth kind of creatures: Gregorian creatures, as Dennett (1995a:377) 
labels them. Gregorian creatures represent that subset of Popperian creatures whose inner 
environments are informed by the designed portion of the outside environment. What is 
particularly important is how these Gregorian creatures create this 'informed' inner 
environment: they do so with the aid of what the British psychologist Richard Gregory 
(1981:311ff.) has called 'mind-tools'. Pre-eminent among the mind-tools, moreover, are 
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words. Words and other mind tools give Gregorian creatures an inner environment that permits 
them to construct what Dennett (1995a:378), calls 'ever more subtle move-generators and 
move-testers'. Figure 4 illustrates the way in which Gregorian creatures act in response to 
pressures ftom the outer environment. 
Gregorian creature imports mind-tools 
from the (cultural) environment; these 
improve both the generators and the 
testers. 
Figure 4 (= Deimett's (1995a:378) Figure 13.4) 
The ways in which Stdnnerian, Popperian and Gregorian creatures differ from each other is 
captured by Dennett (1995a:378) as follows: 
'Skinnerian creatures ask themselves, "What do 1 do next?" and haven't a clue how to 
answer until they have taken some hard knocks. Popperian creatures make a big 
advance by asking themselves, "What should I think about next?" before they ask 
themselves, "What should I do next?" Gregorian creatures take a further big step by 
learning how to think better about what they should think about next. . . ' 
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Gregorian creatures, then, differ from other kinds of creatures in having language as a mind 
tool. Having language, we humans are Gregorian creatures; indeed, having language, we are 
the only species of Gregorian creatures that there is. 
But let us zoom in more closely on what language contributes to making us different from all 
other kinds of creatures. The first thing that language gives us is a unique mechanism for 
controlling our thinking. Following Charles Darwin (1871:57), Julian Jaynes (1976) and 
Howard Margolis (1987), Dennett (1995a:379) observes that language can be used as a mind 
tool for controlling the long trains of thought that are necessary for creating irmer 
environments. Without such control — manifested overtly in the form of self-exhortations and 
reminders — long trains of thought would wander off in what Dennet (1995a: 379) calls 
'delicious if futile woolgathering'. Such long trains of thought are fundamental to the 
mind's/brain's capacity of foresight or long-range look-ahead. This is to say, in fact, that 
language makes science possible, since deliberate, forsighted generating-and-testing is central 
to doing science. It is language that makes possible the methodical backtracking by which we 
can learn from mistakes. 
The second thing that language gives us is a capacity to think in public and to do so 
collectively. Specifically, language makes it possible to make and appraise our mistakes in 
public when conducting science. The ability to make mistakes in public distinguishes us from 
chimpanzees. Though chimpanzees have the ability to learn from mistakes, 'they never get to 
compare notes', as Dennett (1995a:380) puts it. They never dispute over attributions; they 
never ask to know the grounds for each others' conclusions. 
As a tool for controlling long trains of thought and for doing this in public, language makes 
collective thinking possible, which has a profound effect on our brain power. Dennett 
(1995a:381) puts this point as follows: 
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'Comparing our brains anatomically with chimpanzee brains (or dolphin brains or any 
other non-human brains) would be almost beside the point, because our brains are in 
effect joined together into a single cognitive system that dwarfs all others. They are 
joined by an innovation that has invaded our brains and no others: language. I am not 
making the foolish claim that all our brains are knit together by language into one 
gigantic mind, thinking its transnational thoughts, but, rather, that each individual 
human brain, thanks to its communicative links, is the beneficiary of the cognitive 
labors of the others in a way that gives it unprecedented powers.' 
In similar vein, the American neuroscientist Paul Churchland (1995:270) observes that 
language makes it possible, at any time, for human cognition to be collective: 
'It allows a group of humans to address and solve cognitive problems that would prove 
insoluble to any individual operating alone. Finding solutions need no longer be limited 
by one person's memory, one person's imagination, one person'e intelligence, or one 
person's perspective. Language allows us to transcend our individual cognitive 
weaknesses and to conjoin our individual strengths.' 
To put it in another way, language enables human cognition to be transindividual. Which 
brings me to the third thing that language contributes to making us different from other kinds 
of creatures: the capacity to create culmre. As Dennett (1995a: 338) observes, we are the only 
species to have an extra medium of design preservation and design communication, namely 
cultiire. What is especially important is that language is the primary medium of culture and 
that, as such, language, has opened to us new regions in what Dennett (1995a:338) calls 
'Design Space' — a space that only we humans are privy to. As a consequence, we have in a 
few brief millenia been able to transform not only our planet but also the very process of 
design development that created us. In Dennett's (1995a:338) words: 
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'Culture is such a powerful set of cranes that its effects can swamp many .. . of the 
ear l ier genetic pressures and processes that created it and [that — R.P.B.] still coexist 
with it. ' 
What we humans have changed dramatically by means of culture includes our health, our diet 
and our living conditions. These changes, in turn, have produced dramatic further changes in 
the human phenotype, that is in the full set of our observable characteristics. What we are 
today, Dennett (I995a:340) observes, is very much a matter of what culture has made us. And, 
he (1995a:347) emphasizes, 
'Human language, first spoken and then, very recently, written, is surely the principal 
medium of cultural transmission, creating the infosphere in which cultural evolution 
occurs. ' 
Dennett (1995a:338) observes that virtually all the differences between people of Plato's day 
and people living today must be due to cultural changes. The time — fewer than two hundred 
generations — separating Dennett and us from Plato is too short for genetic selection pressures 
to have caused these changes. Had there not been language, these transgenerational differences 
— differences in physical talents, in proclivities, in attitudes, in prospects and so on — would 
not have come about. 
The fourth thing that language has given our species is linked to the way language functions as 
a medium of cultural transmission. It is a new kind of memory, as has been recently noted 
again by Paul Churchland (1995:270): what is called an 'extrasomatic memory'. ChurcWand 
characterizes an extrasomatic memory as a memory that exists outside any individual's brain 
and that survives any individual's death. But how is this possible? Churchland (1995:269) 
observes that much of what our various ancestors learned about the world remains reflected, in 
broad outline, in the vocabulary of the languages that have outlived them. With the appearance 
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of language, hard-won information about what our ancestors found important could be passed 
on effectively from generation to generation. This privileged information is encapsulated in the 
meanings or concepts associated with the words that make up the vocabulary of a language. 
The children of a new generation don't need to gather the privileged information all over 
again: they can acquire it, at least in outline, by learning the vocabulary of the language spoken 
by previous generations. Language, that is, furnishes the 'extrasomatic memory' in which 
privileged information can be stored. This is highly beneficial to our species and its individual 
members since, in the words of Churchland (1995:270) 'the process of learning about the 
world is no longer limited by what can be acquired in three score and ten years'. And this 
process of cumulative learning — transindividual, transgenerational — has, of course, been 
hugely extended by the introduction of written language. 
6 Summary of answers 
To sum up: language has turned human beings into a kind of creature that is special in various 
ways. Language has given us a unique mechanism of cognitive control and, in association with 
that, the capacity of thinking collectively in public. Language has given us the capacity to 
create culture; language also gives us a medium to transmit what we have created or learned 
from gen»ation to generation. Language, in effect, has given us unique means of controlling 
our destiny as a species. This is not to say, of course, that language has made us angels. But at 
least language has freed us from the constraints of apehood. We are not mere talking apes. In 
fact, there cannot be a creature like a talking ape since the cognitive, communicative and 
cultural constraints that are part of apehood are lifted by language. 
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NOTES 
1 For these questions and rq)]ies by Disraeli, see Froude s.a.: 176. Disraeli went on to 
[pronounce: 'I repudiate with indignation and abhorrence the contrary view, which I 
believe foreign to the conscience of humanity. More than that, from the intellectual 
point of view the severest metaphysical analysis is opposed to such a conclusion.... 
What does the Church teach us? That man is made in the image of his Maker. Between 
these two contending interpretations of the nature of man and their consequences society 
will have to decide. This rivalry is at the bottom of all human affairs. Upon an 
acceptance of that Divine interpretation for which we are indebted to the Church, and of 
which the Church is the guardian, all sound and salutary legislation depends. That truth 
is the only security for civilisation and the only guarantee of real progress.' (Froude 
s.a.: 176-177) 
2 For the characterization of the language faculty presented above, see Chomsky 
1980:31ff., 241, 245, Botha 1989:16, 25-26, Botha 1995:104-105, 129-130. 
3 For this characterization of a language, see Botha 1995:154-156, Jackendoff 1994:39-
43, Lyons 1981:17-24, Pinker 1994:87ff. 
4 Genesis 2:19 reads as follows: 'So out of the ground the LORD God formed every 
animal of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what 
he would call them; and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its 
name.' 
5 This claim by Dennett was echoed by the biologist John Maynard Smith (1995:48) in 
his review of Dennett 1995a. 
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6 For a selectionist account of the origin and evolution of language, see Pinker and 
Bloom 1990. Natural selection is characterized by Mayr (1991:183) as "The nonrandom 
survival and reproductive success of a small percentage of the individuals of a 
population owing to their possession of, at that moment, characters which enhance their 
ability to survive and reproduce'. 
7 Dennett and other scholars, e.g. John Maynard Smith (1995), who claim that Chomsky 
considers language to have originated in a miraculous way have misunderstood 
Chomsky's views on the origin of language. For substantiation of this conclusion, see 
Chomsky 1996 and also Botha to appear. 
8 For details on Nim Chimpsky's failure to leam ASL spontaneously, see Fischer 
1994:593 and Churchland 1995:258. 
9 For these points, see Botha 1995:117-118, Fischer 1994:592-593, Pinker 1994:334-
342. For an account of some new research which is claimed to show that pygmy chimps 
exhibit language-like behaviour which is substantially beyond what Nim displayed, see 
Churchland 1995:258-259. 
10 For a survey of the 'languages' or communication systems used by various species of 
apes, see Akmajian, Demers and Hamish 1979:37-47. 
11 According to Dennett, this framework has been anticipated in the work of Konrad 
Lorenz (1973). 
12 In terms of the characterization offered by Mayer (1991), a gene, in classical genetics, 
is 'a unit of inheritance, transmitted from generation to generation by on ovum or 
sperm, which controls some characteristic of an individual or some aspect of the 
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individual's development (p. 180). (Genetic) recombination is 'the reshuffling of an 
organism's genes during the production of germ cells, through crossing over of sections 
of the organism's maternal and paternal chromosomes' (Mayer 1991:180). Mutation, in 
molecular biology, is 'a change in the genotype'; 'mutations in germ cells can cause 
heritable changes in the offspring' (Mayer 1991:182). The genotype of an individual is 
its 'genetic constitution, especially as distinguished from its physical appearance' 
(Mayer 1981:180). 
13 Dennett does not give any examples of the primitive organisms called 'Darwinian 
creatures'. 
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